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A major puzzle is that despite the apparent importance of innovation around the “knowledge economy”, UK 
macro performance appears unaffected: investment rates are flat, and productivity has slowed down.  We 
investigate whether measurement issues might account for the puzzle.  The standard National Accounts 
treatment of most spending on “knowledge” or “intangible” assets is as intermediate consumption.  Thus 
they do not count as either GDP or investment.  We ask how treating such spending as investment affects 
some key macro variables, namely, market sector gross value added (MGVA), business investment, capital 
and labour shares, growth in labour and total factor productivity, and capital deepening.  We find (a) MGVA 
was understated by about 6% in 1970 and 13% in 2004 (b) instead of the nominal business 
investment/MGVA ratio falling since 1970 it is has been rising (c) instead of the labour 
compensation/MGVA ratio being flat since 1970 it has been falling (d) growth in labour productivity and 
capital deepening has been understated and growth in total factor productivity overstated (e) total factor 
productivity growth has not slowed since 1990 but has been accelerating. 
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1 Introduction 
According to common debate, the “Knowledge Economy” is all around us.  Think tanks and commentators 
argue that developed countries have no future in a globalised economy unless they specialise in knowledge-
intensive activities.  Whole goods and occupations, many based on ICT, that were almost unheard of even 
five years ago, proliferate (think of iPods, SatNavs and Search Engine Programmers).  Pressure groups extol 
both the virtues and contribution of the UK design and creative industries. 
Where has all this shown up in UK economic performance?  The ratio of nominal investment to 
nominal GDP has stayed more or less where it was since the 1950s, which is hard to square with the 
perception that firms are investing in knowledge assets in the teeth of a technological revolution.  The share 
of profits in GDP has also remained quite stable, so if firms are investing more, this is not being reflected in 
additional profits.  UK productivity performance over the 1990s remains a puzzle. According to existing 
studies
1 UK productivity growth deteriorated after 1995.  This is in contrast to the US experience, where 
there was a well documented productivity acceleration associated with the ICT investment boom
2. The UK 
also experienced an ICT investment boom in the late 1990s, so why the productivity slowdown? 
Two possible answers could explain these puzzles.  The first is that the investment in and/or the 
impact of the knowledge economy is in fact much less than popular discussion would suggest.  The second is 
that the impact is hidden by measurement problems. 
This paper examines the second view for the UK
3 building on previous work by Oulton and 
Srinivasan (2003), Basu et al (2004) and Oulton and Srinivasan (2005).  Work by Oulton and Srinivasan 
(2003, 2005) examined a number of measurement issues. They incorporated software into output; measured 
capital as capital services, not capital assets; built the capital data from a disaggregated level, and measured 
labour quality rather than just hours. Basu et al (2004) specifically looked at whether ICT measurement 
could explain missing UK productivity growth in the 1990s. The productivity growth slowdown still 
remained in all these studies and the authors argued that it was likely due to unmeasured investment in 
organisational capital.  We build on this work by using all these elements in our data but also adding 
intangible assets (where we think of spending on intangible assets as describing spending on a broad range of 
knowledge-type assets, such as R&D, software, organisational capital etc, details below).  Since one of our 
assets is organisational capital, given the previous work, it is of interest to see if incorporating this can 
change the picture of UK productivity performance in the late 1990s. 
                                                      
1 O’Mahony and De Boer (2002), Oulton and Srinivasan (2003) and Oulton and Srinivasan (2005). 
2 Oliner and Sichel (2000), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000a and b), Stiroh (2002) and Gordon (2003) 
3 The measurement problems addressed in this paper are not problems with the existing UK National Accounts, which 
continue to be compiled based on internationally agreed definitions.  The focus of this paper relates to what the impact 
would be of extending the agreed definition of capital assets to include a broader range of intangible assets. As such, the 
output and productivity estimates should not be regarded as corrections to existing National Accounts rather as 
adjustments to National Accounts data for the wider definition of intangible capital we adopt. 
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Whilst there have been some studies for the US on the impact of intangibles on GDP, such as 
Corrado, Hulten and Sichel
4 (2004, 2006) and Nakamura (1999, 2001, 2003) there has not been anything for 
the UK.  In this paper we follow the central observation in those US papers that in practice, spending on 
most knowledge assets is, in accounting terms, like spending on other intangible assets, such as software.  
Spending on tangible assets has a long measurement tradition; it is part of investment and therefore also part 
of GDP.  However, spending on intangible assets, with a few exceptions, is treated as intermediate 
expenditure.  In constructing GDP therefore, spending on R&D for example, is treated like spending on 
electricity, i.e. it is assumed not to be investment and so produces no asset at the end of the period.  As an 
intermediate it does not appear in either investment or GDP data.
5 
This paper tries to answer the following question: what are the consequences for a range of 
macroeconomic variables, including productivity, of treating knowledge expenditure as investment rather 
than as intermediate expenditure?  We do this as follows.  First, following the approach of CHS, we 
assemble data on knowledge investments for a range of intangible assets.  These are wider than the usual 
R&D and software and include design, spending on reputation and human capital.  Using these data we 
analyse the relative quantities of different types of expenditure and how they have changed over time.  We 
believe this question of interest since we have little information on whether expenditure on software is more 
or less than expenditure on design, training etc. and also on how such expenditure has changed over time. 
Second, we look at the consequences for overall business investment and market sector GVA, 
henceforth MGVA
6.  We believe this to be of interest since some have conjectured that ignoring intangibles 
explains why the traditionally-measured (i.e. focussed on tangible capital) business nominal investment to 
MGVA ratio has remained so flat in the UK despite the perception that the underlying conditions for 
investment have been so favourable in recent years.  We also think it of importance if the level of market 
sector GVA has been systematically understated. 
Third, we look at the consequences for market sector labour productivity.  Since the level of MGVA 
rises, the level of labour productivity rises.  But labour productivity growth will only rise if the level of 
MGVA rises increasingly over the period; so the answer to this question is not as clear.  The reason why 
labour productivity rises is that there is an extra input in the economy, namely an intangible capital stock, in 
addition to the tangible capital stock.  Thus we think a question of interest is: how much has the change in 
the intangible capital stock contributed to productivity growth along with other inputs?  The systematic 
method of answering this question is via growth accounting and so we extend previous UK growth 
accounting studies by including intangible capital.  Note to that not only has MGVA and input changed, but 
                                                      
4 We refer to Corrado, Hulten and Sichel as CHS from here onwards. 
5 Michael Mandler’s (2006) Business Week article for example describes the treatment of Apple by national income 
accountants as ” ..they count each iPod twice: when it arrives from China, and when it sells. That, in effect, reduces 
Apple -- one of the world's greatest innovators -- to a reseller of imported goods.” 
6 Owing to the difficulty of measuring productivity and intangible spending in the government sector we focus on the 
market sector rather than the whole economy. Hence our estimates are based on market sector GVA rather than GDP. 
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the factor shares will have changed as well, since the extra MGVA due to intangibles is matched on the 
income side by extra income to capital. 
It is worth pointing out that we present estimates of MGVA, labour productivity growth and growth 
accounting both with and without intangibles.  Thus the reader uninterested in intangible assets can therefore 
obtain, we hope, some interesting data from the paper.  In particular, our (non-intangible) estimates are 
consistent with the 2006 Blue Book and give data up to 2004.
7   
  Our main findings are as follows.  First, nominal business investment in intangible assets in 2004 is 
about equal to nominal business investment in tangibles (each is around 15% of MGVA).  Of that intangible 
investment, around 50% of the total is on economic competencies (investment in reputation, human and 
organisational capital), 35% on innovative property (mainly scientific and non-scientific R&D and design) 
and 15% on computerised information (mainly software).  Since 1970, nominal investment in intangibles has 
grown from about 6% of nominal MGVA to about 15%.  Interestingly, the patterns of growth look 
remarkably like those in the US, although the UK has a bit less R&D investment and a bit more investment 
in design. 
  Second, accounting for intangibles makes a considerable difference to measured market sector GVA 
and the share of that output accounted for by investment and payments to capital and labour.  The level of 
nominal market sector GVA rises by about 13% in 2004
8.  The share of nominal investment and payments to 
capital also rise.  
  Third, accounting for intangibles affects labour productivity growth (LPG) and total factor 
productivity growth (TFPG) in the market sector.  Without intangibles, we confirm previous work that LPG 
and TFPG both slow down between 1990-95 and 1995-00
9. We also document a further slight slowdown in 
2000-04 in LPG but a speeding up in TFPG.  With intangibles, the picture changes interestingly.  First, both 
LPG and TFPG accelerate between 1990-95 and 1995-00, suggesting that the UK economy was building 
sufficient intangibles during that period such that their omission affected the productivity statistics in 
important ways.  Second, even with intangibles, the post 2000 slowdown in LPG still remains.  
  There are of course a host of measurement problems in estimating investment in intangible assets.  
We therefore assess the robustness of our findings to different measurement methods.  There are a number of 
findings.  First, our major findings (on the shares of nominal investment and wages and LPG and TFPG) are 
robust to changes in the depreciation rates e.g. doubling or halving them.  The reason is that the CHS 
assumed depreciation rates are 20% or above so that these assets depreciate away relatively quickly.   
Therefore, our results depend more on the measured investment levels.  Second, regarding levels, around 
                                                      
7 There are no official UK TFP estimates, so those available are by Oulton and Srinivasan (2005), who give data up to 
2000, and the OECD and Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003 updated 2005), who give data to 2004.   See Appendix 1 
for an outline.  None of these papers look at the range of intangibles we cover (they do include software).  
8 This is less than the share of intangible investment in MGVA because some intangible investment (some software, 
mineral exploration and copyright costs) is already included in MGVA (about 2%).  It is slightly more than the figure in 
Giorgio Marrano and Haskel (2006), but that reported intangible investment as a proportion of GDP. 
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60% of intangible spending comes from official surveys (e.g. the R&D survey, software investment surveys, 
training surveys).  The rest comes either from assumptions built on official surveys or from wages and salary 
surveys used to measure the costs spent by occupations in e.g. organisational capital production. We look at 
the robustness of our main findings to varying the levels of investment in these non-official surveys and find 
they are quite robust.  Thirdly, we look at different time periods, such as peak-to-peak, to ensure our growth 
accounting results are robust to selecting different time periods.  Finally, we rely on an implied market sector 
GVA deflator for many of the intangible assets, the main exception being software.  Without other data on 
this, we cannot explore robustness to this assumption and so this remains an area to be explored.  
  The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows.  In the next section, we set out how intangibles 
affect market sector GVA and growth.  Section three describes the data used to try to measure the impact of 
treating intangibles spending as investment (in our case the impact on business investment and market sector 
gross value added), and section four outlines our growth accounting approach.  Section five presents our 
growth accounting results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Model 
We follow CHS in setting out the following model.  Suppose there are three goods produced, a consumption 
good, with real output volume   and price  , a tangible investment good,  t C
C
t P t I  with price   and an 






2.1  Intangibles treated as intermediates  
Suppose first that the intangible investment good is regarded as an intermediate.  Then the tangible capital 
stock   is assumed to accumulate according to the perpetual inventory model  t K
 
  1 (1 ) tt K t KI K δ − =+−  (1) 
 
with depreciation rate δK (assumed constant over time).  Then we can write the production function for each 
sector and, assuming factors are paid their marginal product and the production function is homogenous of 
degree one, the money flows for each sector as follows 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
9 O’Mahony and De Boer (2002), Oulton and Srinivasan (2003) and Oulton and Srinivasan (2005). 
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where the superscripts N, I and C refer to the three sectors.  So, for example, in equation (2a), the left hand 
side production function in the intangible sector says that the output of intangibles is produced by labour in 
the sector and tangible capital the sector.  The right hand side equation says that with factors paid their 
marginal products, the value of the intangibles produced equals the returns to labour and tangible capital 
used in that sector. 
Since intangibles are assumed to be intermediates, the production functions in 2b and 2c for the 
tangible and consumption sector show that the volume of intangible output is simply an input into the 
production of tangible and consumption goods (we omit other intermediates which similarly net out).  Since 
they are intermediate inputs intangibles do not appear in total output which can be written
10 
 
   (3) 
QC I L K
tt t t t t t t t PQ PC PI PL PK
′ ′ =+ =+
 
where the prime ′ indicates the case where intangibles are treated as intermediate expenditure and   
 and  .    NI LL L L =+ + NI KK K K =+ +
 
2.2  Intangibles treated as capital 
Now suppose that the intangible investment good is regarded as capital.  Then as well as the tangible capital 
accumulation, intangible capital stock,  t R  also accumulates according to  
 
  1 (1 ) tt R t R NR δ − =+ −  (4) 
 
where R depreciates at rate δR.  The production function and money flows for each sector can be written  
  
                                                      
10 This equation shows the equality of GDP on the expenditure side (consumption plus investment) and income side 
(rewards to the non-intermediate factors labour and capital).  On the production side, value added in the C, I and N 
sectors are, respectivey, the value of consumption less payments to intangibles used in the consumption sector (the 
intermediate good), the value of investment less payments to intangibles in the investment sector and the value of 
intangibles. Adding these up gives economy value added as the value of consumption plus investment, which with 
factors being paid their marginal product is equal to wages and capital payments in all three sectors. 
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Note that in contrast to (2) the stock of intangible capital,  t R , rather than intangible output, appears as an 
input in the production functions and the payments to that stock,  , appears in the payment equations 
rather than payment for the entire used up intermediate output.  The corresponding output identity now 
includes the value of output of the intangible good on the production side,  , and the payments to the 












   (6) 
QCI N L KR
tt tt t t t t t t t t t PQ PC PI PN PL PK PR =+ + =++
 
where the total output of the intangible good  NI NN N N = ++ and the intangible stock is 
NIC R RRR =+ + . 
  Thus the following points are worth noting.  First, output is increased under the second approach 
from   to  .  Second, the investment rate increases from 
Q
t PQ




tt t t PI P Q
′ ′ to ()
IN Q
tt t t t t PI P N PQ +  
and the labour share falls from 
LQ
tt t t PL PQ
′ ′ to 
LQ
tt t t PL PQ, where the labour share is the proportion of 
total income paid to labour.  
Finally, to understand the implications for TFPG, we may write a growth accounting relation from 
the production functions above 
 
   (7) 
( ) ln ln ln ln





aT F PQ s L s K
bT F P Q s L s K s
′′ ′ ′ ∆= ∆ − ∆ − ∆
∆= ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ t R
                                                     
 
where the top equation (a) shows the expression for TFPG=∆lnTFP in the case where intangibles are 
expensed and the lower equation (b) where they are capitalised and the shares of each factor are denoted with 
an s.
11  As the equations show, the effect of including intangibles on TFPG is ambiguous.  Whilst the level of 
output has risen, the growth rate may or may not rise depending on the growth rate of real intangible 
investment.  So the effect on ∆lnQ is ambiguous.  In addition, the capitalisation of intangibles means that 
 
11 The shares are the payments to each factor as a share of total payments to all factors.   Total payments add up to 
output which of course consists of payments to two factors when intangibles are intermediates and payments to three 
factors when expensed, thus the shares are different between (a) and (b). 
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(the growth in) an additional input has to be included as a determinant of growth.  Thus we have more capital 
assets accounting for ∆lnQ so that TFPG may rise or fall.  Note finally that the shares differ between (a) and 
(b) since both output and the payments to capital differ. 
The extra output from now including intangible output (with value  ) is mirrored by the 
payments to the extra factor of production, namely the intangible capital stock.  Since it is a part of capital, 
this increases the overall payments to capital. 
N
t PN t
Also, the production functions make clear that the intangible input is the volume of intangible 
spending in the first case and the (flow of services from the capital) stock of intangible capital in the second.  
This means that the income flows have be evaluated using the rental rates of labour, tangible and intangible 
capital services. 
It is worth noting that GDP has been criticised as a useful measure for capturing the New Economy.  
One criticism is the use of gross output in a situation where increasingly short-lived assets, such as 
computers, are appearing in the economy, thus raising depreciation payments.  The distinction between gross 
and net output is discussed in Hulten (2000).  Weitzman (1976) studies an economy maximising the 
discounted sum of future consumption subject to two constraints: (a) the capital accumulation constraint 
(similar to (2) above) and (b) the constraint that total output is split between either consumption or 
investment (i.e. a production function constraint Y=C+I =F(K,L), where Y is output, C is consumption, I is 
investment, K is capital and L is labour).  He finds that the optimal consumption path is in fact equal to 
(nominal) net national product (NNP) which differs from GDP by depreciation, which accords with the 
intuition that an economy with increased depreciation payments may be no better off when considering the 
available resources available for consumption (taking account of the need to invest in order to consume in 
the future). Oulton (2004) notes that one needs all the information in GDP to calculate depreciation in order 
to get to NNP and that as a matter of data, depreciation payments as a fraction of GDP have remained about 
the same. He highlights that US real NNP and real GDP both have accelerated at the same rate post-1995.  
Hence, whilst real NNP might be a superior welfare measure, in practice it has grown at the same rate as real 
GDP in recent years in the US at least. Hulten (2000) argues that the correct interpretation is that whilst the 
growth in NNP, under these assumptions, corresponds to the growth in welfare, growth in GDP represents 
the rise in the supply-side constraint.  Thus the analysis of GDP is an analysis of the constraint not an 
analysis of the outcome of an objective function and a constraint.  Kay (2001) suggests that since welfare 
depends on real consumption, the investment component of nominal GDP should be deflated by 
contemporaneous consumption prices and not by hedonically adjusted investment prices as is the practice 
when computing real GDP.  However, as he acknowledges, the hedonic adjustment is consistent with the 
measurement of services from computers, which is the theoretically appropriate measure in a production 
7    
function context.  It is also consistent with the real GDP convention of measuring real consumption plus real 
investment.
12   
 
3  Intangible spending and the overall investment and labour shares 
Section four sets out how we undertook our growth accounting analysis.  Here we discuss our data on 
intangible spending, investment and the overall investment and labour shares. 
  
We follow CHS in identifying three main intangible asset classes:  
A. computerised information (mainly software),  
B. innovative property (mainly scientific and non-scientific R&D) and  
C. firm competencies (company spending on reputation, human and organisational capital). 
 
These categories accord with, for example, categories used by the UK competition authorities in calculating 
intangible assets for the purposes of competition analysis, see Giorgio Marrano and Haskel (2006) (GH). 
3.1  Spending on intangible assets 
Table 1 shows our choice of intangible assets, their data sources, the expenditure figures, the proportion of 
the expenditure assumed to be investment (following the assumptions of CHS), the percentage of total 
intangible investment, their deflators and depreciation rates. In this paragraph we will limit our attention to 
the first six columns. 
The first column shows the type of intangible asset.  The second column shows the data source used 
to measure the expenditure for the various assets for the 2004 cross section. Column three shows the sources 
for the time series estimates. Column four shows the expenditure figures for 2004 (as previously reported in 
GH (2006)). Column five shows the proportion of expenditure that is assumed to be investment
13.  Column 
six shows the percentage of total intangible investment accounted for by each of the separate intangible 
assets.  
The type of intangibles, column one, and the data sources for the cross section, column two, have 
been extensively described in GH (2006). There are two minor changes with respect to the last paper: all the 
data are now consistent with the 2006 Blue Book and therefore they include any revisions, and in the asset 
                                                      
12 This argument is related to that used to try to explain why the acceleration in US productivity measured as GDP per 
person has not translated into increased wages per person.  Baker (2007) argues that wages can rise with increases in 
NDP and not GDP insofar as rises in GDP are increasing due to extra depreciation and that what he calls “usable 
productivity” has been rising at 2.31% 2001:1 to 2006:2, against GDP productivity which has been rising at 3.19%.  As 
a matter of data, Oulton (2004) argues that whilst US NDP grows more slowly than GDP, both have accelerated at the 
same rate post 1995 since depreciation payments are roughly unchanged.  In addition, to calculate NNP one has to work 
out depreciation and so one needs to undertake a hedonic adjustment to do this. 
13 We follow the assumptions of CHS (2004). For detailed discussion on the proportion of expenditure assumed as 
investment see CHS (2004). 
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“new architectural and engineering design” we include also twice the turnover of the SIC 74782 “Speciality 
designs activities” (around £4bn in 2004).  Below we will focus on the time series estimates. 
3.1.1 Computerised  information 
This is straightforward.  As pointed out in GH (2006) for computer software, row 1 column 2, we use ONS 
data published in Chamberlin et al (2006).  The data are available from 1970 as shown in row 1 column 3. 
3.1.2  Innovative property  
For Scientific R&D, row 2 column 2, we use expenditure on R&D as published in BERD.  In row 2 column 
3 we show the time series availability: we have BERD data back to 1981. We backcast it back to 1970 using 
the expenditure on R&D in private sector (MA14) published in the Annual Abstract of Statistics.  Note that 
we exclude R&D reported in the computer industry in order to try to minimise double counting with 
software.  For Mineral exploration and Copyright and license costs, as shown in row 5 column 2 and row 6 
column 2, we use data from the National Accounts. The series go back to 1970 as indicated in column 3. 
New product development costs in the financial industry, row 8 column 2, is estimated, in the 
absence of better data, as 20% of intermediate consumption by the Financial Services Industry.  Row 8 
column 3 shows the time series availability: we have data on intermediate consumption from the annual 
Input-Output analysis back to 1992. We backcast the series using the growth rates of the turnover of the 
sector “Banking, finance, insurance, business services, leasing” from the Blue Book (after constructing a 
consistent time series using various Blue Book editions). 
For new architectural and engineering design, row 9 column 2, we use 50% of turnover data for the 
SIC category 742 reported in the ABI plus twice the turnover of the speciality design sector, SIC74782 (with 
the twice figure based on data from the design council who estimated 50% of the sales of this sector was 
own-account spending).  As row 9 column 3 shows these data goes back just to 1995. For the period 1994-
1992 we use the turnover data from the Service Sector Review that is roughly consistent with the ABI data. 
As shown in the table, we then backcast the series form 1991 to 1985 using the growth rate of the turnover of 
architect and engineers as published in the Business Monitor. From 1984 to1979 we backcast using the 
growth rate of the turnover of the total business service sector as published in the Business Monitor. We then 
backcast further the series to 1970 using the growth rate of the turnover of the sector “Banking, finance, 
insurance, business services, leasing” from the Blue Book mentioned above. 
R&D in social science and humanities, row 10 column 2, is estimated as twice the turnover of the SIC 73.2 
industry.  We have ABI turnover data back to 1995. For the years 1994-1992 we use turnover data for this 
SIC category published in the Service Sector Review We backcast the series to 1986 using the growth rates 
of the turnover of the sector “research and development services” published in Business Monitor. For the 
period 1985-1981 we backcast using the growth rate of R&D form BERD. Finally, we backcast the resulting 
series to 1970 using the growth rate of R&D in the Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
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3.1.3 Economic  competencies 
For advertising expenditure, row 13 column 2, we use data from the Advertising Association that  goes back 
to 1956.  We estimate market research, row 14 column 3, as twice the turnover of the industry. We have data 
on turnover from ABI back to 1995. As above, we use the turnover data from Service Sector Review for the 
years 1992-1994 and we backcast the resulting series with growth rates of advertising expenditure. 
We turn now to firm-specific training. As shown in row 16 column2 we used NESS2005, a survey 
on employer provided training that provides expenditure data for 2005.  Unfortunately there is no consistent 
previous survey and so we are forced to backcast our data.  To do this, we used trends in wage costs and the 
industrial structure of the workforce to extrapolate the results of this survey.   We used the data in NESS2005 
of training expenditure by one digit industry.  To this we matched a series for the wage bill for the 
corresponding sector (using the OECD/STAN industry data).  We calculated the ratio between 2005 training 
expenditure and the wage bill for 2005 and applied this ratio to the wage bill series.  This then assumes a 
constant incidence of training by sector over the period.  We then assumed, following CHS, a 2% yearly 
increase in incidence of training. 
Turning finally to investment in organisational capital/structure we need purchased and own account.  For 
purchased, see row 18 column 2, we use turnover of management consultants provided by the Management 
Consultancy Association (MCA) for 2004 and we backcast using the growth rate of the turnover of the SIC 
7414. back to 1995 and for 1994-1992 with Service Sector Review.  Prior to that we use the turnover of 
management consultants as shown in the Business Monitor to backcast to 1985 and the turnover of the whole 
business sector back to 1979. From 1979 to 1970 we use Blue Book data mentioned above.  We estimate own 
account spending, on organisational structure, row 13 column 3, as one fifth of a subset of managers’ 
earnings. We backcast ASHE 2004 data using ASHE and NESPD earnings series (after constructing a 
consistent time series). For the years using 1974-1970 we backcast using sector average wage growth from 
STAN (OECD). 
3.2  Investment in intangible assets 
Column five shows the fraction of current spending, following CHS, that is assumed to be investment.  There 
are no clear empirical guides here.  The main deviations from unity are for brand equity, and purchased 
organisational capital spending.  For brand equity CHS assume that 60% of spending on advertising is 
building a reputational asset.  One reason why asset investment might be less than total spending can be seen 
by considering for example spending on advertising by a duopoly where spending is boosted by the 
competitive desire to build market share, but where whole economy brand capital might not necessarily be 
increased.  In addition, CHS assume that 80% of purchases of management expertise are capital spending, 
the rest perhaps being day to day advising.  We shall discuss the sensitivity of our results to varying these 
parameters below. 
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3.3  Cross section results 
To give some idea of the scale of expenditures, column 4 sets out expenditure on each asset for 2004.  This is 
then converted to investment using the fraction in column 5. Column 6 then shows the fractions of total 
intangible investment each row accounts for.  The following points are worth noting.  First, around 50% of 
total investment is on firm spending on reputation, human and organisational capital (economic 
competencies).  About 35% is on innovative property and 15% on computerised information.  Second, 
according to these numbers, investment in R&D is just one part of investment in knowledge assets.  In fact, 
R&D investment is less then investment in software for example.
14  Third, the biggest single figure is 
training investment.  
3.4  Time series results 
Figure 1 shows the time series for nominal intangible investment for the aggregated categories as a share of 
adjusted nominal market sector GVA (see section 4.5). The first chart shows the time series for the US from 
CHS (2006) while the second reproduces the estimates for the UK.  It is a cumulative graph so that that top 
(black) line shows the share of total intangible investment in intangible-adjusted market sector GVA.
15  The 
lowest line shows the share of brand equity and the line above that shows the share of brand equity plus the 
firm-specific resources.  Thus the gap between the lines is the share of each category of investment.   
  A number of points are worth making.  First, the total line shows the growing importance of nominal 
intangible investment in the economy, rising from around 6% of market sector GVA in the 1970s to 13% in 
2004 (6% to 15% of unadjusted market sector GVA, which includes some software i.e. as currently 
measured in the National Accounts).  Second, all investment types have risen, with the exception of brand 
equity, which is more or less flat.  The most marked increases are for computerised investment and firm-
specific resources.  These two groups show therefore the biggest increases in the share of overall intangible 
investment.   
3.5 Labour  shares 
The labour share is calculated as the ratio between compensation of employees and the sum of labour 
compensation and capital compensation, the latter called operating surplus in the UK National Accounts (in 
turn, for the whole economy, this adds up to nominal GDP, subject to some minor tax/subsidy and statistical 
adjustments).  One problem in calculating this is the treatment of the income of the self-employed, whose 
income, termed “mixed income”, might be considered a combination of labour and capital income.  It is 
included, in the UK market sector data, with operating surplus.  This boosts the capital share of course and 
                                                      
14 Although the two types of spending might have quite different potential spillovers. 
15 That is, the denominator is gross value added in the market sector, adjusted for the presence of intangible investment, 
see below for how we calculate this. 
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thus potentially boosts the fraction of market sector GVA growth that is capital deepening.
16  We decided to 
split mixed income into labour and capital income.  One way of doing it is to use the Labour Force Survey to 
work out the pay of employed workers with a similar age, skill etc. profile to the self-employed.  When we 
do this, we find that, apparently almost all of mixed income is labour income (about 98%).  The other 
method is to allocate mixed income according to the labour and capital ratios calculated after subtracting the 
mixed income from the operating surplus.  We apply these ratios to the mixed income and we add the 
relevant quantity to the operating surplus and labour compensation.  We settled on the final option and as a 
consequence, the labour share is higher than in the case in which the mixed income is left in the operating 
surplus.   
Figure 2 shows the time series for the labour share in the both the UK and the US (again based on 
CHS (2006) excluding and including intangibles.  The first chart shows the labour share from 1970 to 2003 
for the US while the second chart for the UK.  A number of points are worth noting.  First, the level of the 
labour shares are similar, with the 1970 level being about 68% excluding software and intangibles and 63% 
including them (the US figures are 71% and 66%).  Second, the overall trend in both countries is flat when 
excluding intangibles and falling when including them.  If anything the trend is smoother in the US, 
reflecting the UK change from the peak in the mid 70s, (well known union push) and the trend downwards to 
the early 1980s.  
3.6 Investment  shares 
Figure 3 shows nominal investment shares as a percentage of MGVA for the UK and US including three 
cases: traditional National Accounts excluding software, including software (this is not shown in the US 
graphs) and including all intangibles (where in the UK data the MGVA denominator excludes software, 
includes software and includes all intangibles respectively). There are two major findings.  First, in both 
countries, without intangibles, the nominal investment share is flat or a little bit decreasing and is a similar 
amount (around 15%).  Second, once we include intangibles it increases in levels, to around 25% by the end 
of the period and the trend is upwards. 
 
4 Growth  accounting 
To implement the growth accounting set out in section 2, we proceed as follows.  First, we measure labour 
input L as employee hours.  Second, we express MGVA and capital in per employee hour terms.  Third, in 
practice the quality of labour likely varies and so we distinguish between employee hours, L and quality 
adjusted employee hours, L
QA.  Thus our growth accounting expressions are 
 
                                                      
16 Indeed calculated on this basis the UK capital share is about 10 percentage points above the non-farm business US 
capital share.  None of the international comparisons of labour shares that we could find gave this kind of difference; in 
most of them, capital shares are much closer across countries.  
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A number of points are worth noting regarding (8).  First, the shares are averages of shares over which the 
time difference it taken, so that (8) is a Tornquist index number.  Second, the share of capital is defined as 
one minus the share of labour.  This is accurate if there are constant returns to scale at the overall economy 
level, but clearly an area where better measurement would be helpful.  Third, since there are in practice many 
capital assets (for tangibles, plant, buildings, vehicles and computer hardware; for intangibles, software, 
R&D etc.) the ∆lnK and ∆ln R terms have to be constructed to incorporate these many types.  This is done 
following Oulton and Srinivasan (2003), who in turn follow Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), by noting that 
the theoretically correct capital measure in a production function is the services that capital provides into 
output.  In turn the services for each type of capital can be measured by the rental payments that a profit-
maximising firm would pay were it renting its capital.  Since in practice firms rarely do this but buy the 
capital asset for a price p
A and then use it over its lifetime, the market-clearing rental payment for an asset B 
(where B can be tangible or intangible assets), p
B, can be derived as  
 
,1 ,1 () ,
BA A A A
it it it i t it it it i t p Trp p p p BK R −−  =⋅ + δ ⋅ − − =   (9) 
 
where T is a tax adjustment and r is the rate of return on the asset.
17 This equation holds for each type of 
capital i.  The relation between this and the ∆lnK and ∆lnR terms in (8) can be derived as follows. First, the 
overall level of profit in the economy, Π, is, by definition, the overall payments to capital, which is the sum 
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where there are n tangible assets and n+1 to m intangible assets.  Second, the overall volume index of capital 
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17 The derivation of   is set out in Oulton and Srinivasan (2003).  If firms buy the capital good for pt
A, they earn a 
rate of return r, but suffer a capital loss as it depreciates via wear and tear (δ) and a loss or gain if it changes in value 
(pt
A- pt-1
A).  At the margin, the firm must be indifferent between renting the asset for (the unobserved price) pt
K and 
buying it and this formula ensures this is the case. 
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where the shares are the flow of rental payment for each asset as a share of total rental payments (Π).
18  As 
an empirical matter, we have to take a number of steps.  First, we do not have information on time-varying 
depreciation rates and so set them constant over time.  Second, we do not have information on asset-specific 
rates of return, ri.  In a competitive market, ri will equalise across assets.  If we assume this then we have two 
equations (9) and (10) in two unknowns, namely r and p
K which we can solve for, which enable us to 
calculate .  The economic intuition of this is that since we know the overall payment to capital, Π in the 
economy, from National Accounts, we can solve for the unobserved asset-specific rental prices that would 
ensure that all payments to capital assets added up to Π.  Third, in line with the Tornquist method above, the 
weights in (11) are the time-averaged weights over which the difference is taken. 
  To summarise, we therefore implement growth accounting in the following steps.  
1.  Collect a time series of nominal investment in intangible and tangible assets, deflate to get 
real investment series, and build a real capital stock using perpetual inventory method, see 
equations (1) and (4). 
2.  Re-calculate market sector GVA to include intangibles, see equation (6)  
3.  Adjusted the operating surplus Π for market sector GVA, see equation (10) 
4.  Build a Hall/Jorgenson VICS measures of all capital inputs, ensuring the asset rental 
payments are consistent with the adjusted operating surplus, see equations (9) to (11) 
5.  Build a quality adjusted labour index to measure L
QA in (8) 
6.  Undertake growth accounting, in (8) 
 
The next sections describe how to do this. 
4.1  Collect a time series of nominal investment in intangible and tangible assets 
Investment in intangible assets is set out above.  For tangible assets, we use the data from Wallis (2007) (see 
also Wallis, 2005).  Briefly, the dataset consists of a long back-history of constant price investment data, 
Blue Book 2006 consistent, classified by SIC92 industries. The asset breakdown of the investment series is: 
buildings, plant and machinery and vehicles. In order to treat computers as a separate asset, computer 
investment is separated from investment in plant and machinery and the associated price deflators adjusted to 
account for this.  The data are then aggregated to market sector levels. 
4.2  Deflate to get real investment series 
The choice of deflators, as CHS discuss, is a difficult one.  One possibility is to develop a price index for the 
particular intangible according to the costs incurred in developing it, so that, for example, if most of the costs 
of R&D is payments to scientists, then the deflator might be the wage of scientists.  As CHS show however, 
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this implicitly assumes that scientists have no increase in productivity in the R&D process.
19  A second 
possibility is to use the output deflator.  This is sometimes justified in studies of, for example, R&D, where a 
physical unit, this case of knowledge, has little meaning and so it is felt best to deflate by the price of the 
good which presumably embodies the knowledge that the R&D is generating.  Triplett and Bosworth (2004 
p.260), citing Bailey, offer a similar justification for management consultants.   
Our deflators are set out in more detail in Table 1.  For computer hardware, we use data from the ONS 
the Bank of England and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR).  They are close to 
each other only in some years. ONS stops in 1984 and so we backcasted using NIESR data. We have 
explored US deflators and the results are robust to this change.  Software deflators are taken as follows.  For 
own account we use wages of the relevant occupations and then a 2.5% productivity adjustment.  Whilst this 
has the problem similar to the R&D deflator above, it is used by the ONS and so has the benefit of being 
consistent with their practices (which is useful in our context since the at least part of software is 
incorporated into the National Accounts; it is also consistent with the US treatment of software).  For 
purchased software we use the ONS purchased software deflator.  Turning to the remaining tangible assets 
we use deflators for plant, vehicles, non-IT machinery, and buildings consistent with the UK National 
Accounts (see Wallis, 2005). 
4.3  Build real capital stock using perpetual invent method  
A constant depreciation rate assumes geometric depreciation, the accuracy of which is of course open to 
question as well as requiring one to settle on a depreciation rate.  Given the doubts and uncertainty over this, 
we settle here on applying conventional assumptions about tangible assets to the accumulation of intangible 
assets.  Table 1 sets out our assumed rates. For intangible assets these are based on CHS (2006) assumptions. 
For tangible capital we use existing National Accounts deflators.  Our sensitivity analysis included varying 
the assumptions on the intangible asset side. 
4.4  Adjusting operating surplus of market sector GVA. 
The ONS publishes market sector operating surplus series back to 1992.  In order to perform a productivity 
analysis we are interested in the productive stock and therefore we subtract household operating surplus (that 
includes the imputed rental from housing) and actual rental from housing.  We back cast the series to 1970 
using the gross operating surplus growth rates for the whole economy.  To adjust the operating surplus for 
the intangibles we simply add nominal intangible investment.  We build three versions of market sector gross 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
18 By contrast the wealth stock, which is often presented as a measure of capital, is the share-weighted sum of capital 
stocks, where the shares are the asset prices.   
19 Consider for example the CRS relation 2a.  Differentiating with respect to time, the growth rate of the price of the 
intangible good is the growth rate of the prices of the inputs, weighted by their shares in overall GDP less any TFP 
growth in the intangible production process.  Assuming that the price growth rate is just wages assumes no other factors 
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operating surplus.  The first version excludes software investment already present in the National Accounts. 
The second includes this investment and add also the future revision to National Accounts software estimates 
presented in Chamberlin et al (2006).  The third includes all intangibles 
  Concerning labour compensation, the ONS publishes market sector labour compensation series back 
to 1992.  We back cast the series using the growth rate of the OECD estimated wage bill.   
4.5  Re-calculate market sector GVA to include intangibles.   
The ONS publish a time series back to 1992 of market sector GVA at current prices.  For productivity 
analysis we subtract actual and imputed rental from housing (consistent with the treatment of operating 
surplus above).  We backcast the series using the growth rate of the sum of the market sector labour 
compensation and operating surplus.  To adjust for the intangibles we simply add the nominal investment in 
intangibles (note not spending but investment) to nominal market sector GVA ensuring that we do not 
double count any intangibles already included (such as some software and mineral exploration).   
Regarding the real market sector growth rate, the ONS publishes time series that goes back at least to 
1970.  We adjusted the real growth rate for intangibles devising an index of changes in real market sector 
adjusted GVA as a share-weighted change of real market sector GVA and real intangible investment, with 
the weights being the share of each expenditure category in overall GVA.   
As for the gross operating surplus we build three versions of GVA.  The first version excludes 
software investment already present in the National Accounts. The second includes this investment and adds 
the planned revision to the software estimates.  The third includes all intangibles. 
  From the nominal market sector series and real market sector series we derive an implicit deflator 
that we used to deflate all intangibles except software. 
4.6  Build Hall/Jorgenson VICS measures of all capital assets 
To do this we use method described above (equations (9), (10) and (11)). We smooth the rate of return and 
the capital gain term by taking a three-year moving average. All rates of return are positive, but for some 
years in the middle 1970s the building rental rates were negative.  We set them equal to the nearest positive 
rate. 
4.7  Quality adjusted labour index 
We use here the Bank of England index that adjusts hours for education, gender and age, see Bell, Burriel-
Llombart, and Jones (2005), kindly provided to us by Nick Oulton and Sally Srinivasan. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
are used in production and there is no TFP growth in the production of intangibles.   An alternative is to develop a price 
index based on the weighted shares, which assumes zero MFP growth in the process generating the good.   
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5  Growth accounting results 
5.1 Overall 
In the results that follow we use the following conventions.  The growth in capital services and labour quality 
are Tornquist indices as is the growth in market sector GVA.  The averages reported are 100 times the 
arithmetic averages of year-on-year Tornquist growth rates (e.g. 2000-04 is average of 2000-1, 2001-2, 
2002-3, 2003-4).  TFP growth is residual and the capital and labour shares add to 1.  Our growth accounting 
decompositions start in 1979 with our intangible capital data set equal to zero in 1970. However, due to the 
period we are most interested in being the 1990s and our data being of better quality from 1990 onwards our 
analysis focus on 1990 onwards. This also allows us to ignore any initial conditions problems in association 
with the intangible capital stock.
20 
We undertook two main checks on the data.  First, the ONS Blue Book 2006 does no growth 
accounting but does include some software in output.  Thus we generated market sector GVA data excluding 
all software, including just software, and including all intangibles.  We checked our data that included 
software against the ONS data and found the growth rates very close
 21.  Second, Oulton and Srinivasan have 
undertaken a major industry-level study that includes software both in their output data and their capital 
services data (Oulton and Srinivasan, 2005).  These results were up to 2000 and were consistent with the 
2002 ONS Blue Book.  The 2002 Blue Book data had limited coverage of software so a major contribution of 
Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) was to add in software to both output and capital services.  In recent 
unpublished worked, they use data to 2003, consistent with the 2005 ONS Blue Book, again incorporating 
software.  A change here is that ONS have revised their employee-hours data to be consistent with the 2001 
population Census and Oulton and Srinivasan have revised their data accordingly.  We use their labour hours 
and quality measure, that they kindly supplied us. This allows us to make a better comparison of our baseline 
results, without intangibles, with theirs. 
5.2  Growth accounting results, 1990-2004 
Table 3 shows the growth accounting results for 1990-2004.  We look at this period to compare the 
results with Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) and to explore a major “fact” in the UK, namely the 1995-2000 
slowdown in both LPG and TFPG (in stark contrast to the US speed up). 
Table 3 has three panels. The top panel shows growth accounting results when we exclude software. 
The middle panel includes software and the bottom panel includes all intangibles. Each panel has three rows: 
the first row shows the period 1990-1995, the second 1995-2000 and the third 2000-2004. The columns show 
averages of the annual Tornquist growth rates for each period.  The first column shows LPG (recall this is 
                                                      
20 The tangible capital stock is based on a very long run of investment data, back to the 1800’s in some instances, so 
there are no initial conditions problems to deal with. 
21 The Blue Book 2006 includes somewhat less software than we do for example, for 2004, our data is about £21bn 
while in the Blue Book 2006 is about £11bn. 
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growth per hour in market sector labour productivity), the second capital deepening (the change in capital 
services per hour times the share in capital), the third human capital deepening (the change in quality-
adjusted labour services per hour times the share of labour) and the fourth TFPG.  TFPG is the first column 
less the sum of the second and the third. Before considering our results in detail, we wish to check that the 
number accord with other sources.  As mentioned above, Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) is one benchmark for 
the comparison of the results.  That paper published growth accounting results for the period 1970-2000 
based on the Bank of England Industry data set (BEID)
22.  In turn, the BEID is based on the then current 
National Accounts with an adjustment for software.
23  More recently, Oulton and Srinivasan have revised 
and updated their data to 2003.  They kindly provided us with their updated quality-adjusted labour inputs 
and hours data, both of which we have used here
24.   
Their updated data are unpublished, but turn out to be quite similar to the results here, where the 
appropriate panel for the comparison is the one including software (the middle panel of Table 3).  The main 
difference is that our 1995-00 LPG is a bit faster.  Looking at their raw series, we find this difference arises 
from the fact that in the updated BEID set there is a dip in growth of labour productivity in 1998-9 whereas 
we do not have so much of a dip. 
It is worth noting in passing however that there is a major difference between these results and the 
Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) results.  In those data, there was a major fall in LPG between 1990-95 and 
1995-00 of 1.05 percentage points per annum (pppa). LPG in the two periods was 3.99pppa and 2.93pppa.  
In our data this is much smaller (see the middle panel).  This is because we use the BEID new set of hours 
data, which is in turn based on that from the ONS.  The old hours data were very different, more negative in 
1990-95 and more positive in 95-00.  With these new hours data, based on the 2001 Census of population, 
the slowdown is much less pronounced. 
Turning to the other results, the main results are as follows.  First, adding software increases LPG in 
every period.  As set out above, the addition of software raises market sector GVA, so that the level of labour 
productivity rises, and this table shows that the growth of labour productivity rises too.  Note that adding the 
rest of the intangibles further raises LPG except in the very last period where it falls slightly relative to the 
last period in the middle panel.  This suggests that the pace of intangibles expansion is less over that period. 
  Second, the addition of intangibles gives a different picture to the 1990s LPG slowdown mystery.  
Looking at the top panel, when software and other intangibles are excluded we see that LPG slowed down 
                                                      
22 The Bank of England Industry data set is described in Oulton and Srinivasan (2003b). 
23 And a few other adjustments such as to financial services output, see Oulton and Srinivasan (2005). 
24 We collected data for intangible spending and market sector GVA up to 2004.  The Bank of England data on hours 
and labour quality however goes up to 2003.  Thus we interpolated these variables for one year by running a regression 
of them on two lags of themselves and current and lagged GDP.  To check the data we compared the new hours data 
with an ONS market sector hours series and an ONS whole economy labour quality measure (kindly supplied by Peter 
Goodridge) (both start in 1999 and so we cannot use them for the full data period).  Our single interpolated year 
matched the behaviour of these ONS series well. 
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from 2.93pppa to 2.72pppa.  Looking at the middle panel, where we include software, we see a similar 
slowdown, from 3.01pppa to 2.91pppa.  However, the results in the final panel are most interesting: there we 
see a speed up, from 3.09pppa to 3.23pppa.  If these measures of intangibles are correct then, the mid 1990s 
slowdown was a statistical illusion caused by not accounting for investment in intangibles.  Clearly our 
estimates are subject to a wide range of assumptions but these data do suggest that measurement is likely to 
be a first-order issue in understanding the mid-1990s slowdown.  In the section below we show how robust 
this slowdown is to changes in our assumptions.  
  Third, consider capital deepening.  Adding software increases capital deepening in every period 
(compare the top and middle panels). There are two possible explanations for this. Recall that capital 
deepening is the product of the capital share and growth rate of capital services. When including software the 
share of capital goes up and therefore, ceteris paribus, capital deepening rises.  The growth rate of capital 
services per hour in theory, could increase, remain the same or decrease
25.  Table 4 shows the reason for the 
rise in capital deepening.  The top panel shows capital deepening without including software, the middle 
panel shows the inclusion of software and the bottom panel shows the inclusion of all intangibles.  The two 
right hand panels divide up the capital deepening into the income shares and the growth of capital services 
per hour, dividing these terms in turn between the contributions of ICT and non-ICT.  As Table 4 shows, if 
we look at the top and middle panel, the share of capital (column 9) and the capital services per hours 
(column 12) increases in all periods when we include software. 
Returning to Table 3, when we include all intangibles (see bottom panel) capital deepening increases 
further in every period by an amount of between 0.37pppa and 0.28pppa. Table 4 shows that the increase is 
mainly due to the share of capital increasing as the total capital services per hour growth rate stays roughly 
the same.  
Fourth, regarding TFPG, the top panel shows the results already established in the literature, namely 
a fall in TFPG in the middle 1990s.  Note an acceleration in 2000-04, which is a new result.  The middle and 
lower panels show the effects of introducing software. Recall that, as the earlier theory section noted, the 
effect of the inclusions of extra investment can increase, decrease or have no effect on TFPG. The middle 
panel shows that TFPG still slows down in the mid90s, but speeds up in 2000-04. The lower panel most 
interestingly shows that TFPG speeds up in the mid90s, and speed up again 2000-04.  Thus with these data at 
least, the 1990s TFPG puzzle is removed, namely there was a speed-up at that time which had been masked 
by the failure to adjust market sector GVA for intangible investment and is apparent even thought the new 
TFPG numbers include the extra knowledge input.  There was then further speeding up in TFPG (and LPG) 
in the early part of this century.   
                                                      
25 Capital services growth is a rental cost weighted sum of individual capital services growth, where the rental prices are 
determined exogenously to exhaust overall payments to capital.  Thus adding new capital assets changes the weights 
and so the growth of capital services might rise or fall.  
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To shed further light on this, consider similar data for the US.   The post-2000 record for the US is set 
out in Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2007).  They document a rise in LPG from 2.70pppa 1995-00 to 3.09pppa 
2000-05, with rises in capital deepening (1.51pppa to 1.56pppa), labour quality (0.19pppa to 0.36pppa) and 
TFPG (1.00pppa to 1.17pppa).  Our nearest comparison would be the middle panel, which includes software.  
We have falls in LPG, capital deepening and human capital deepening, but a rise in TFPG. Thus the question 
raised by these data is not the behaviour of TFPG, but rather what were the set of incentives that led the US 
to raise its capital deepening that did not operate in the UK.
26 
5.3  The role of ICT 
Before turning to the comparison with the US we return to Table 4 to examine the role of ICT.  The two left 
hand side panels for the top and middle rows divide capital deepening into ICT and non-ICT and into ICT, 
non-ICT tangible and other intangibles for the bottom panel.  This decomposition is first shown with the 
actual figures and then with the proportions.  If we look at the left hand side of the middle panel and look at 
the rows corresponding to the years 1990-1995 and to years 1995-2000 we can see that the ICT capital 
deepening increased while the non-ICT decreased; in the middle panel in the period 1990-1995 ICT capital 
deepening was 44.7% of total capital deepening while non ICT was 55.4%. In the period 1995-2000 it is 
reversed:  ICT accounts for 74.6% of capital deepening while non-ICT just 25.4 %.  In the most recent 
period up to 2004, ICT again accounts for the lion’s share of capital deepening.  Turning to the right hand 
side panel we can see that both the share of ICT and the capital services per hour increased in the late 
nineties while for non-ICT the share remained the same the capital services decreased.  Finally, the fall in 
capital deepening 2000-04 is entirely due to a fall in ICT hardware capital investment.   
5.4  Growth accounting results 1979-04 and a comparison with the US 
In Table 5 we set out the comparison with the US where the US data are taken from CHS (2006).  Note that 
our pre-95 data starts in 1979 and our data finishes in 2003 as opposed to 2004 in earlier tables (to be 
consistent with CHS).  As before, for the US there are three panels.  The top one excludes software, the 
middle panel includes software only and the bottom panel all intangibles.  For comparison we therefore show 
our versions which respectively exclude software, include software only and all intangibles. 
The most direct comparison is for the years 1995-2003 and it is summarised in rightmost panel, with 
each contribution a percentage of LPG, with LPG shown in the top row. The key results are the following.  
First, looking at overall LPG for 1995-2003, we see that is somewhat higher in the US whether intangibles 
                                                      
26 It may seem surprising that the UK performance is so similar to the US performance given all the discussion about 
superior US economic performance since 2005.  Two points are worth bearing in mind.  First, Timmer, Ypma and van 
Ark (2003, updated 2005) note that between 1995 and 2004, US LPG has been 1.8%, EU 1.4% and UK 1.6%.  So the 
UK has been doing somewhat better than the US.  Second, the EU was growing much faster than the US before 1995 
and now the opposite is the case, and so much of the mystery is about the relative lack of acceleration rather than the 
relative growth rates. 
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are included or not, but is similar. What is dissimilar is that US LPG accelerated sharply after 1995, whereas 
the UK productivity growth did not, although it was growing much faster during that pre-95 period. 
Second, turning to the contributions to LPG over the comparable period 1995-03, we see that capital 
deepening is a higher share of LPG in UK than in US.  It is about 64% (top right panel) while for the US is 
35%.  Note that in most international comparisons the European share of capital deepening in LPG is usually 
higher than the US (as EU catches up to US by installing capital).  Note too that the contribution of capital 
deepening rises as more intangibles are included: 64% of LPG with no software, 67% with software and 73% 
with all intangibles.  In addition, comparison of rows 3 and 2 in the bottom panel shows about 75% 
(1.54/2.14) of UK capital deepening is due to tangible capital compared to just 50% (0.85/1.68) in the US. 
Third, the contribution of human capital deepening in 1995-2003 is very similar in both countries, at 
about 14% of labour productivity (top right panel).  Fourth, in all cases, the contribution of TFP is less as a 
share of LPG in the UK than in the US. Fifth, we can get some idea of the contribution of intangibles by 
looking at the bottom panel.  Comparing row 3 and row 6 in the right panel we see that 53% of UK LPG is 
due to tangibles and 28% in the US this shows a bigger contribution to LPG of intangibles in the US. 
5.5  Contributions of each intangible asset 
In Table 6 we look at intangible capital deepening and how much each component accounts for.  As above 
the table shows the US and UK comparison pre-95 and post-95, with rightmost panel showing post-95 
fractions of intangible capital deepening accounted for by each intangible category. The main results are the 
following. First, if we look at the right panel in the US there is a large contribution of R&D while in the UK 
has more of contribution from non-scientific R&D.  Indeed the share of overall contribution of scientific 
R&D is almost zero in the UK.  This is an interesting result that accords with popular discussion that UK 
design etc. is “strong” whilst UK R&D lags behind the US. 
Second, in UK there is a bit more contribution of firm-specific capital. This confirms the finding on 
other data sets that firm specific training is higher in the UK relative to the US (see GH, 2006).  
5.6  Comparison of the effects of adding intangibles in the US and UK 
Finally, we ask the question what difference does the inclusion of intangibles make in each country?  To 
answer that, Table 7 shows the differences between LPG and its constituent parts with and without 
intangibles, for US and UK. The upper panel shows the difference when we include all intangibles against 
when we exclude all intangibles and include software. The lower panel shows the difference between when 
we include all intangibles against when we include just software. 
The main results are that the sign of the difference is the same in all cases: when we include 
intangibles in both the US and the UK, LPG and capital deepening rises and TFP falls.  Turning to the 
details, the upper panel shows the increase in LPG from including intangibles with respect to the case in 
which we exclude software is quite similar in both countries: 0.31 in the US and 0.34 in the UK.  The 
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increase in capital deepening is higher in the US, but this could be because capital deepening in the UK is 
already quite high.  The decline in TFP is more in US, but again this because US MFP higher than UK 
The lower panel shows that the increase in LPG is similar in both countries, the increase of capital 
deepening is slightly higher in the US and, as above, the decrease in TFP is higher in the US. If we compare 
the LPG of each country in both panels we can see that a big part of the effect of intangibles is due to 
software.  If we look at UK, for example we see the increase in LPG from zero intangibles to all intangibles 
is 0.31 but this increase is reduced to 0.14 when we account for software. 
5.7  Sensitivity of results 
Given the range of assumptions that we have had to make, an obvious question is how robust our results are.  
Since we have quite a lot of results, we organise our robustness checks around three main results: the path of 
the investment share, the path of the labour share and the difference in LPG, capital deepening and TFPG 
over the 1990s.  Table 8 shows some selected sensitivity analysis from a wider range of sensitivity analysis 
we conducted
27 together with the base case (our chosen estimates as presented above).  It consists of six 
panels.  Each shows the investment shares (columns 1 and 2) and labour share (columns 3 and 4) over the 
decades 70-80 and 94-04 and the difference between the growth rates of 95-00 and 90-95 for labour 
productivity, capital deepening and MFP (columns 5, 6 and 7).  The base case in the top panel shows results 
for the three cases: excluding software, including software, including all intangibles; the other panels show 
results for the two cases of with software and with all intangibles. 
  Panel (a) shows the base case.  As mentioned in the previous paragraphs when we include 
intangibles we see an increase in the nominal investment share of market sector GVA and a decrease of the 
labour share.  We also do not have a slowdown for productivity and MFP in the period 95-00 but a speed up. 
  Panel (b) shows the same table when all conversion factors (the factors that convert intangible 
spending into intangible investment, set out in Table 1, column 5) are divided by two.  This is equivalent to 
halving all intangible investment, quite a drastic change.  As the second panel shows, we still have an 
increase in the nominal investment share and a fall in the labour share although it is reduced.  Adding 
intangibles does not lead to a speed up in LPG and MFPG but to a substantial reduction in the slowdown. 
  Panel (c) shows the results when we halve all the conversion factors except the one for software.  
The same observation as for panel 2 applies, although the reduction of the “intangible effects” is reduced 
compared to panel 2 (there is for example a small speed up in LPG). 
  Panel (d) shows the results when we double all depreciation rates (note that for brand equity we set 
the rate equal to 0.9 as it is already 0.6).  The results are very similar to the base case suggesting that the 
results are robust to the changes in the depreciation rates.  The only difference with panel one is a slower 
speedup in TFPG (row three column 7). 
                                                      
27 We focus on those that have the largest impact on the results. These also happen to be the ones that are the most 
interesting. 
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  Panels (e) and (f) show results when we, respectively, add and subtract 50 percent of each 
component of intangible investment.  We make these changes to the figures just for the assets that we 
consider more uncertain either in the definition and/or the measure, recall that they are about 40% of 
intangible spending. They are new product development for the financial sector, new architectural and 
engineering design, human sciences R&D and organisational structure both purchased and own account.  
When we add the 50 percent, in panel 5, all our findings (on the investment and labour share and LPG and 
TFPG) are re-enforced.  When we subtract this amount the investment share increase and the labour share 
decrease is reduced compare to the base case and so is the LPG and MFPG speed up. 
  Figure 4 shows the same results for LPG and TFPG in diagrammatic form for ease of presentation.  
The figure shows LPG and TFPG with all intangibles in the periods 90-95, 95-00, 00-04 and the pattern 
when we change the assumptions as in table 8.  So in panel (a) for example, we show LPG (left panel) and 
TFPG (right panel) in (a) the base case, (b) halving all the conversion factors used to multiply expenditure 
into investment (see table 1, column 5) (c) halving all factors bar software.  The LPG slowdown in the 2000s 
is consistent, as is the TFPG speedup.  The 1990s TFPG slowdown is apparent in both the robustness checks.  
Looking at the other pictures, the TFPG speedup over the whole period is mostly maintained, along with the 
2000s LPG slowdown. 
  In summary the quantitative results are robust to large changes in the depreciation rate and 
conversion factors.  The qualitative direction of these effects for LPG and TFPG is robust but the 
quantitative effect is somewhat reduced, the slowdown in LPG and TFPG is rather reduced. The robustness 
of our results suggest that, despite the associated measurement issues and number of assumptions needed, 
our results shed light on the UK productivity record and the importance of intangible investment in 
understanding recent productivity performance.  
We also undertook some further robustness checks including a growth accounting analysis for 1990-
2000, which encompasses an entire business cycle (peak-to-peak).  We found that the inclusion of the 
intangibles raises LPG from 2.83pppa to 3.16pppa, and decreases TFPG from 0.58pppa to 0.50ppa.  That 
intangibles continue to have an important impact when looking at an entire business cycle shows that our 
results are not just driven by our choice of periods for growth accounting. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has tried to understand better the impact of the “knowledge economy” on recent UK economic 
performance.  The central question is one of measurement and follows the important papers by Oulton and 
Srinivasan (2003), Basu et al (2004) and Oulton and Srinivasan (2005). We explore the consequences for a 
range of macroeconomic variables of treating knowledge expenditure as investment. 
We do this by assembling investment data on a range of knowledge assets, such as scientific R&D, 
but also including software, design, non-scientific R&D and spending by firms on reputation, human and 
organisational capital.  We look at the consequences for market sector GVA and business investment.  We 
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then look at the consequences for productivity by calculating the new implied labour productivity growth and 
total factor productivity growth.  
  Our main findings are as follows.  First, our data on investment in intangible assets look remarkably 
like those in the US.  Nominal intangible investment in 2004 was about equal to nominal tangible investment 
spending, each around 15% of MGVA.  Around 50% of total intangible investment is on economic 
competencies, 35% on innovative property and 15% on computerised information.  Since 1970, nominal 
investment has grown from about 6% of nominal MGVA to about 15%.  Second, accounting for intangibles 
raises MGVA (by about 6% in 1970 and 13% in 2004) and also the shares of nominal investment and capital.  
Third, accounting for intangibles also affects labour productivity growth (LPG) and total factor productivity 
growth (TFPG).  Without intangibles, we confirm previous work that LPG and TFPG both slow down 
between 1990-95 and 1995-00.  We also document a further slight slowdown in LPG 2000-04, but a speedup 
in TFPG.  With intangibles, the picture changes interestingly.  First, both LPG and TFPG speedup between 
1990-95 and 1995-00.  Second, even with intangibles, the post 2000 LPG slowdown still remains but TFPG 
speeds up. 
  We compare our estimates to the US study by CHS (2006).  Like them, from 1995-03, including 
intangibles raises LPG and lowers TFPG but there are some interesting differences.  First, in the UK more of 
LPG is capital deepening and more of that capital deepening is tangible capital deepening.  Second, there are 
slightly different contributions from different intangible types: R&D makes more of a contribution to capital 
deepening in the US, but design and training more of a contribution in the UK. 
  Clearly much future work could be done to improve the estimates presented in this paper.  Our 
robustness checks indicate a number of areas where more work might particularly inform our estimates.  
Perhaps the biggest is that whilst we think that company organisational capital is quantitatively important we 
do not have a very good measure of it, either own account spending or bought in knowledge e.g. from 
consultants.  Nor do we have very good deflators for many intangible assets at the moment.  However, it is 
worth noting that our main results are robust to varying a number of these measures.  All this suggests that 
the view of macro performance changes quite substantially with different measurement and so these 
questions are worth pursuing. 
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Table 1: Intangibles 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Computerized information
(1) Computer software ONS estimates 2004-1970 ONS data 21.59 1 16.7 ONS deflators 0.33
(2) Computerised databases Included in our software estimates
(3) Total 21.59 17.7
Innovative property
(4) Scientific R&D
Current expenditure on R&D from 
BERD.  R&D in computer industry 
subtracted
2004-1981 BERD
1980-1970 Backcast using the growth rate in the 





















New product development costs in 
the financial industry
20% of all intermediate purchase 
by Financial Services industry, 
ONS data.  Intermediate 
purchases reduced by purchases 
of adv, software, consulting and 
design.
2003-1992 20 % of intermediate consumption of 
the financial sector (SIC 65, 67 I-O 100,102). 
Source: Input - Output Analysis
1991-1970 Backcasted using the growth rate of 
the turnover of the sector "Banking, finance, 
insurance business services, leasing" from the 
Blue Book (after constructing a “consistent” time 
series with the Blue Book data ).






New architectural and engineering 
designs
Estimated as half of the total 
turnover of the architecture and 
design industry SIC 742, ABI data. 
Turnover reduced by purchases of 
adv, software, consulting.Includes 
also turnover of "speciality design 
activities" SIC 74782 multiplied by 
2 two to consider also own 
account
2004-1995 50% of the turnover of the industry SIC 
72, source ABI published data.
1994-1992 50% of the turnover of the industry SIC 
72, source Service Sector Review.
1991- 1985 Backcasted using the growth rate of 
the turnover of architects and engineers as 
published in Business Monitor.
1984 - 1979 Backcasted above using the growth 
rate  Assumption: Turnover of SIC 74.2 grew at 
same rate as total business services
1979 – 1970 Backcasted using the growth rate of 
the turnover of the sector "Banking, finance, 
insurance business services, leasing" from the 
Blue Book (after constructing a “consistent” time 







R&D in social science and 
humanities
No broad statistical information. 
Estimated as twice industry 
revenues of social science and 
humanities R&D industry 
2004-1995 Two times the turnover of the SIC 73.2. 
Source: ABI
1994-1992 Two times the turnover of SIC 73.2. 
Source: Service Sector Review
1991-1986 Backcast using the growth rate of the 
turnover of “Research and Development services” 
as in Business Monitor. Assumption: The 
Business monitor survey although different 
captures the same trends of the sector
1985-1981 Backcast using the growth rate of R&D 
Berd. Assumption: R&D Berd (mainly scientific) 
and R&D in human sciences grew at the same 
rate
1981-1970 Back cast using the growth rate of 






(11) Total 39.5 32.4
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 Table 1 continued 
 

















Total spending on advertising as 
reported by Advertising 
Association, less expenditure on 
classified ads






Twice revenues of the market and 
consumer research industry as 
reported in ABI.
2004-1995 Twice the turnover of industry 74.13 
source ABI
1994-1992 Turnover of the sector from Service 
sector review
1991-1970 Backcast using Advertising 
Association growth rate of turnover. Assumption: 
the turnover of the market research industry grew 






(15) Total 18.5 1 9.1
(16) Firm-specific human capital
NESS05, a similar survey of 
employer provided training, 
adjusted to consider private sector 
expenditure and all UK
1970-2004 Backcast using trends in wage costs 
and the industrial structure of the workforce to 









Data on revenues of managment 
consulting industry from 
Management Consulting 
Assocation.  To obtain the private 
sector expenditure we applied the 
private sector/total expenditure of 
the MCA to the grossed up total of 
the industry (still provided by the 
MCA)
2004-1992 MCA data for 2004 adjusted to cover 
just the private sector backcasted using growth 
rate of turnover of SIC 7414 excluding PR source: 
ABI from 1995-2004 and using Service Sector 
Review for 1992-1994
1991-1985 Backcasted using growth rate of 
turnover of category “management consultant” 
source Business monitor
1984-1979 Backcasted using growth rate of the 
total business services as published in Business 
Monitor
1979-1970 Backcasted using data above using 
turnover of the sector "Banking, finance, insurance 
business services, leasing" from the Blue Book 
(after constructing a “consistent” time series with 
the Blue Book data )






No broad statistical information. 
Estimated as 20% of value of 
executive time using ASHE data 
on wages in executive 
occupations, excluding software 
occupations.
2004-1975 Managers earnings 2004 backcasted 
using ASHE and NESPD ( constructing a 
consistent time series)







(19) Total 22.3 17.1
(20) Total 69.6 49.9
(21) GRAND TOTAL 130.8 100
 
Source: Our calculations 
Notes: Column (1) shows the type of intangible investment. Column (2) indicates the data sources used for the cross 
section 2004. Column (3) shows the data sources for the time series. Column (4) shows the expenditure for each asset 
for 2004. Column (5) indicates the percentage of the expenditure assumed as investment. Column (6) shows for each 
intangible asset which percentage of total intangible investment it represents. Column (7) indicates the deflator used and 
Column (8) the depreciation rate .ONS is the Office for National Statistics. BERD is Business Enterprise Research and 
Development. ABI is Annual Business Inquiry. ASHE is Annual Survey Hours and Earnings. STAN is the structural 
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Table 2: Tangibles 
Asset type Time series Deflator Depreciation rate




National Accounts consistent 
investment series (see Wallis, 
2005 for details)
ONS delflator (for 1983-1970 
backcasted using growth rates 




National Accounts investment 
series. Consistent with 2006 
Blue Book. Net stock estimates 
based on Wallis (2007).





National Accounts investment 
series. Consistent with 2006 
Blue Book. Net stock estimates 
based on Wallis (2007). 
Computer hardware excluded 
following method described in 
Wallis (2005).




National Accounts investment 
series. Consistent with 2006 
Blue Book. Net stock estimates 
based on Wallis (2007).




Source: Wallis (2007) 
Notes: Column (1) shows the asset type. Column (2) indicates the data sources for the time series. Column (3) shows 
the deflator used and column (4) the depreciation rate. BEA is Bureau of Economic Analysis. NIESR is National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research. 
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Table 3: LPG growth accounting 









1990-1995 2.93 1.40 0.83 0.70
1995-2000  2.72 1.82 0.44 0.46








1990-1995 3.01 1.55 0.81 0.65
1995-2000  2.91 2.00 0.43 0.48








1990-1995 3.09 1.90 0.73 0.46
1995-2000  3.23 2.27 0.38 0.57
2000-2004 2.61 1.71 0.25 0.65
 Excluding software
 Including software
 Including all intangibles
Source: Our calculations. 
Notes: LPG: labour productivity per hour growth. Capital deepening: share of capital times the growth rate of capital 
services per hour. Human capital deepening: share of labour times the difference between quality adjusted and non-
adjusted hours growth. TFPG: growth rate in total factor productivity calculated as LPG minus capital deepening and 
human capital deepening. Data are averages in percent per annum. 


























1990-1995 0.55 0.85 1.40 38.96 61.04 100 4.06 28.22 31.41 16.90 3.17 4.55
 1995-2000  1.32 0.51 1.82 72.30 27.70 100 5.47 27.72 31.99 29.55 1.87 5.71
2000-2004 0.69 0.49 1.18 58.31 41.69 100 5.89 24.66 30.10 15.51 1.95 4.03




















1990-1995 0.69 0.86 1.55 44.65 55.35 100 4.34 28.05 32.57 15.70 3.17 3.39
 1995-2000  1.49 0.51 2.00 74.61 25.39 100 5.93 28.03 33.60 25.04 1.87 7.03






















1990-1995 0.65 0.90 0.36 1.90 33.97 47.24 18.80 100 4.06 28.22 7.59 39.43 15.69 3.20 5.45 4.90
 1995-2000  1.38 0.51 0.39 2.27 60.54 22.48 16.98 100 5.47 27.72 8.75 41.05 25.00 1.89 4.75 5.54
2000-2004 0.79 0.49 0.42 1.71 46.31 28.96 24.68 100 5.89 24.66 9.99 40.14 13.21 2.01 4.61 4.31
GHW excluding software
Capital deepening: average annual 
growth rates, % per annum
Proportion of total capital 
deepening' % per annum
Income shares (% of market sector 
GVA)
Capital services per hour: growth 
rates  (% per annum)
GHW including software
Capital services per hour: growth rates  (% per 
annum)
GHW including all intangibles
Capital deepening: average annual 
growth rates, % per annum
Proportion of total capital 
deepening' % per annum
Capital deepening: average annual growth 
rates, % per annum
Proportion of total capital deepening' % per 
annum
Income shares (% of market sector GVA)
Income shares (% of market sector 
GVA)
Capital services per hour: growth 
rates  (% per annum)
 
Source: Our calculations 
Notes: The top panel shows capital deepening without including software, the middle panel includes software and the bottom panel includes all intangibles.  The two right 
hand panels divide capital deepening into the income shares and the growth of capital services per hour, dividing these terms in turn between the contributions of ICT and 
non-ICT.  Data are averages in percent per annum .The capital deepening figures in the left hand side are not quite the same as the income shares times the capital services 
because of averaging.  
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Table 5 Comparison with US: Annual change in Labour productivity on farm business sector (market sector for the UK) 
US UK 
1973-1995 1995-2003 1979-1995 1995-2003 1995-2003 1995-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Labour productivity growth 1.36 2.78 2.55 2.59 2.78 2.59
2=3+4 Capital deepening 0.6 0.98 1.23 1.64 2/1 35 64
3        IT equipment 0.33 0.7 0.50 1.13 3/1 25 44
4        Other tangible capital 0.27 0.28 0.73 0.51 4/1 10 20
5 Human capital deepening 0.28 0.38 0.55 0.36 5/1 14 14
6=1-5-2 TFP growth 0.48 1.42 0.78 0.58 6/1 51 22
1 Labor productivity growth  1.47 2.95 2.67 2.73 2.95 2.73
2 Contribution of components:
3=4+5 Capital deepening 0.73 1.26 1.35 1.82 3/1 43 67
4       IT equipment and software 0.46 0.99 0.62 1.31 4/1 34 48
5       Other equip. and structures 0.27 0.27 0.73 0.52 5/1 91 9
6 Human capital deepening 0.27 0.37 0.54 0.35 6/1 13 13
7=1-6-3 TFP growth 0.47 1.32 0.78 0.56 7/1 45 20
1 Labour productivity growth (percent) 1.63 3.09 2.86 2.93 3.09 2.93
2=3+6 Capital deepening 0.97 1.68 1.66 2.14 2/1 54 73
3=4+5       Tangibles 0.55 0.85 1.21 1.54 3/1 28 53
4               IT equipment 0.3 0.6 0.46 1.02 4/1 19 35
5               Other  0.25 0.24 0.75 0.52 5/1 81 8
6=7+8        Intangibles 0.43 0.84 0.44 0.60 6/1 27 20
7               Software 0.12 0.27 0.12 0.18 7/1 96
8               Other (new CHS) 0.31 0.57 0.32 0.41 8/1 18 14
9 Human capital deepening 0.25 0.33 0.49 0.31 9/1 11 11
10=1-9-2 TFP growth 0.41 1.08 0.72 0.48 10/1 35 16





Including  intangibles 
 Excluding software
 
Source: UK data our calculations. US data CHS (2006). 
Notes: the Table shows the comparison between UK and US.  UK data starts in 1979.  The top panel excludes software, the middle panel includes software only and the 
bottom panel all intangibles. In the top panel the first row shows the growth rate of labour productivity per hour. The second row shows capital deepening defined as share 
of capital times the growth rate of capital services per hour. Capital deepening is split in IT equipment (hardware in this case) and other tangible capital. Row 5 shows 
human capital deepening as in table 3. Row 6 indicates the growth rate of TFP calculated as row (1)-row (2) - row (5).  The middle panel shows the same information as 
the top panel, the only difference is that IT equipment includes also software. In the bottom panel the first row shows the growth of labour productivity per hour as above. 
The second row shows capital deepening, which is split into tangibles (row 3) and intangible (row 6).  Tangibles are in turn spilt in IT equipment and other (which 
includes also the intangible already in the NA) and Intangibles is split into software and other intangibles. Row shows human capital deepening and row 10 TFP growth 
defined as above.  The most direct comparison is for the years 1995-2003 and it is summarised in rightmost panel, with each contribution as percentage of Labour 
productivity growth (LPG) with LPG shown in the top row.  Data are averages in percent pen annum. 
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Table 6 Table Contribution of Intangible capital deepening to the Annual Change in Labour Productivity, Non farm business sector (percentage points) 
(market sector for UK) 
US UK 
all intangibles 1979-1995 1995-2003 1979-1995 1995-2003  1995-2003 1995-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Intangible capital deepening 0.43 0.84 0.47 0.59
2       Computerized information 0.12 0.27 0.12 0.18 2/1 32 31
3=4+5       Innovative property 0.13 0.22 0.16 0.14 3/1 26 24
4             Scientific 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.01 4/1 10 1
5             Nonscientific 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.14 5/1 17 24
6=7+8       Economic competencies 0.17 0.35 0.19 0.26 6/1 42 45
7             Brand equity 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04 7/1 10 6
8             Firm-specific resources 0.13 0.27 0.15 0.23 8/1 32 39
US UK
 
Source: UK data our calculations. US data CHS (2006). 
Notes: The Tables splits intangible capital deepening, defined as the share of intangible capital times the growth rate of intangible capital services per hour, into its 
components. Brand Equity includes: advertising and market research. Firm specific resources include: firm specific human capital and organisational structure. Scientific 
R&D includes: scientific R&D and mineral exploration. Non scientific R&D includes: copyright and licences costs, new product development costs in the financial 
industry, new architectural and engineering design and R&D in social science and humanities. Computerized information includes: software. The most direct comparison 
is for the years 1995-2003 and it is summarised in rightmost panel, with each contribution as percentage of Intangible capital deepening. Data are averages in percent per 
annum. Data are averages in percent per annum. 
 
31 Table 7 Difference between LPG (and constituent parts) with and without intangibles for US and UK 
  US UK
 1995-2003 1995-2003
(1) (2)
Labour productivity 0.31 0.34
Capital deepening 0.70 0.50
Human capital deepening -0.05 -0.05
TFP growth -0.34 -0.10
Labour productivity 0.14 0.19
Capital deepening 0.42 0.32
Human capital deepening -0.04 -0.04
TFP growth -0.24 -0.08
Differencess between data including all intangibles and data including 
software
Differences between data including all intangibles and data excluding 
software
 
Source: Table 5 
Notes: The Table shows the differences between Labour productivity growth and its constituent parts with and without 
intangibles, for US and UK. The upper panel shows the difference when we include all intangibles against when we 
exclude all intangibles (also software). The lower panel shows the difference between when we include all intangibles 
against when we include software. Labour productivity is per hour, Capital deepening is share of capital times the 
growth rate of capital services per hour. Human capital deepening is share of labour times the difference between 
quality adjusted and non adjusted hours growth TFPG: growth rate in total factor productivity calculated as Labour 
productivity growth minus capital deepening and human capital deepening. Data are averages in percent per annum. 
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis 
Base case
LPG KDEP TFPG
(a) 70-80 94-04 70-80 94-04 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
without 
software
16.87 14.46 68.89 68.46 -0.21 0.42 -0.25
with software 17.04 16.32 68.73 66.78 -0.10 0.45 -0.16
with all 
intangibles
22.15 24.79 63.98 59.26 0.14 0.37 0.12
All conversion factors (from expenditure to investment) divided by 2
LPG KDEP TFPG
(b) 70-80 94-04 70-80 94-04 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
with software 17.00 16.01 68.77 67.06 -0.18 0.45 -0.25
with all 
intangibles
19.64 20.50 66.30 63.04 -0.05 0.41 -0.09
All conversion factors divided by 2 except software
LPG KDEP TFPG
(c) 70-80 94-04 70-80 94-04 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
with software 17.04 16.32 68.73 66.78 -0.10 0.46 -0.16
with all 
intangibles
19.68 20.78 66.27 62.80 0.03 0.42 -0.01
Double depreciation rate (brand equity = 0.9)
LPG KDEP TFPG
(d) 70-80 94-04 70-80 94-04 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
with software 17.04 16.32 68.73 66.78 -0.10 0.49 -0.20
with all 
intangibles
22.15 24.79 63.98 59.26 0.14 0.49 0.00
Expenditure on uncertain intangibles = exp+50%exp
LPG KDEP TFPG
(e) 70-80 94-04 70-80 94-04 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
with software 17.04 16.32 68.73 66.78 -0.10 0.45 -0.16
with all 
intangibles
22.94 26.57 63.25 57.70 0.20 0.36 0.18
Expenditure on uncertain intangibles = exp-50%exp
LPG KDEP TFPG
(f) 70-80 94-04 70-80 94-04 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95 95/00-90/95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
with software 17.04 16.32 68.73 66.78 -0.10 0.45 -0.16
with all 
intangibles








Source: Our calculations 
Notes: inv/mGVA is the nominal investment as a share of market sector GVA. wl/GVA is the labour as a share of 
market sector GVA. LPG is labour productivity, market sector GVA per hour for all persons. KDEP is capital 
deepening. TFPG is total factor productivity growth. Columns (5) (6) and (7) show the difference between the values 
the relevant variable takes in period 1995-2000 and 1990-1995.  Panel (a) shows the base case. Panel (b) shows the 
results when we divide all the conversion factors used to multiply expenditure into investment (see table 1, column 5) 
by two. Panel (c) shows the results when we halve all conversion factors except the one for software. Panel (d) shows 
the results when we double all the depreciation rates except brand equity, which is set to 0.9.  Panel (e) shows the 
results when we double the expenditure on each intangible investment series that are considered more uncertain, see 
text.  These are new product development costs in the financial industry, new architectural and engineering design, 
R&D in social science and humanities, market research, purchased organisational structure and own-account 
organisational structure. Panel (f) shows the results when we halve these uncertain expenditures. 
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Source: UK data our calculations. US data CHS (2006). 
Note: The figure shows the time series for intangible investment for the aggregated categories as a share of market 
sector output. For the UK output is market sector GVA adjusted to include all intangibles. For the US output is non-
farm business output.  The first chart (a) shows the time series for the UK while the second (b) shows the time series for 
the US. It is a cumulative graph so that that top (black) line shows the share of total intangible investment in intangible-
adjusted market sector GVA.  The lowest line shows the share of brand equity and the line above that shows the share 
of brand equity plus the firm-specific resources.  Thus the gap between the lines is the share of each category of 
investment.  Brand Equity includes: advertising and market research. Firm specific resources include: firm specific 
human capital and organisational structure. Scientific R&D includes: scientific R&D and mineral exploration. Non 
scientific R&D includes: copyright and licences costs, new product development costs in the financial industry, new 
architectural and engineering design and R&D in social science and humanities. Computerised information includes: 
software 
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Source: UK data our calculations. US data CHS (2006). 
Note: The figures show the time series for the labour share in the both the UK and the US excluding and including 
intangibles.  The first chart (a) shows the labour share from 1970 to 2004 for the UK while the second chart (b) shows 
the labour share from 1950 to 2003 for the US. For the UK output is market sector GVA adjusted to be consistent with 
the amount of intangibles included. For the US output is non-farm business output.   
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Source: For US data CHS (2006) for UK data our calculations 
Notes: The figures show investment shares as a percentage of market sector GVA for the UK and non-farm business 
output for the US in three cases: traditional National Accounts excluding software, including software (this is not shown 
in the US graphs) and including all intangibles.  In each case the market sector GVA for the UK is the appropriate 
version for the amount of intangibles included. 
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TFPG  exp plus
50%
TFPG  exp minus
50%
Source: Our calculations 
Notes: The figure shows the sensitivity analysis for labour productivity growth and total factor productivity growth for 
the case in which we include all intangibles.. LPG is labour productivity, market sector GVA per hour for all persons, 
growth. TFPG is total factor productivity growth.  Panels on the left hand side show the sensitivity analysis for LPG 
while panels on the right hand side for TFPG.  Each panel shows the base case and the results when we change the 
assumptions.  In panel (a) we halve all the conversion factors used to multiply expenditure into investment (see table 1, 
column 5). It shows also the case in which we halve all the factors except the one for software. Panel (b) shows the 
results when we double all the depreciation rates except brand equity which is set to 0.9 as in the base case is already 
0.6.  Panel (c) shows the results when we double and we halve the expenditure on each item which we consider 
uncertain, see text.  The uncertain items are new product development costs in the financial industry, the new 
architectural and engineering design, R&D in social science and humanities, market research, purchased organisational 
structure and is own account organisational structure. 
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Appendix 1: Comparison of growth accounting estimates 
Official TFP estimates are not produced in the UK. Thus we have found the following three sources for UK 
growth accounting: Oulton and Srinivasan (2005), the OECD statistical portal, and the EU KLEMS database. 
The Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) results are discussed in section 5.1.  Note the strong LPG and TFPG 
slowdowns, which, with the new hours data are much less pronounced.  In this appendix we focus on the 
comparison with the recent estimates of EU KLEMS and the OECD statistical portal.  In order to compare 
we present an output growth decomposition instead of a productivity growth of our results. In the table 
below we set out the different results. 
Figure A1: Comparison of growth accounting estimates 
(Note these data are not per person hour as in the main text) 
 
Output growth Labour contrib Capital contrib TFPG
1990-95 1.54 -0.21 1.11 0.65
1995-00 3.99 1.13 2.37 0.48
2000-04 2.54 0.21 1.32 1.00
1995-04 3.34 0.72 1.91 0.71
Output growth Labour contrib Capital contrib TFPG
1990-95 1.7 -1.0 0.9 1.7
1995-00 3.8 1.2 2.0 0.6
2000-04 2.8 0.5 0.9 1.3
1995-04 3.3 0.9 1.5 0.9
output growth labour contrib capital contrib tfpg
1990-95 1.69 -0.78 0.88 1.59
1995-00 3.18 0.69 0.99 1.50
2000-03 1.39 0.17 0.54 0.68






The first panel shows our output growth decomposition when we include software.  The second panel shows 
the EU KLEMS results for market sector. In the longer period, 1995-04, the results are quite similar.  In the 
shorter periods the results remain similar except in 1990-95 (first row) for TFPG (fourth column). Our figure 
is smaller than EU KLEMS one because we have a bigger labour contribution.  The difference seems to be 
due to different hours and quality adjustment series. 
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The third panel shows the OECD results for the whole economy.  Note that the data are available up to 2003 
therefore the results for the period 2000-2003 are not strictly comparable with the other sources. The results 
are rather different in comparison with our results, the main differences being: b) a smaller speed up for 
Capital contribution in period 95-00 c) no slowdown for TFPG in 95-00.  Note however that the OECD 
explicitly states that their data should be used for international comparisons and not for individual country 
analysis.  Their Output growth numbers are similar to ours in the pattern of the speed up in the late nineties 
although the magnitude is smaller, but the main difference is that we have a rise in capital deepening in the 
late 90s that they do not have. Note that this mid90s increase in capital deepening is in both our data and the 
EU KLEMS data. 
 
Appendix 2: Note on treatment of capital stocks 
Following Oulton and Srinivasan (2003), we assume that capital stocks in place in the middle of the period 
yield output over the course of the period.  The capital stock in the middle of period t is estimated as the 




,1 , 1,..., it it i t it KA A A i −  == ⋅ =  n   
The accumulation of capital is as per above  
  ,1 (1 ) it it i i t BI B − =+ − δ ⋅   
but the amount of the capital asset in place is assumed to depreciate evenly over the year and so is given by  
 (1 / 2) it i it AB δ = −⋅   
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